



WOMEN'S DECISION-MAKING POWER IN AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS

KEY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS METHOD CONDUCTED IN 462 AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS

KEY FINDINGS

DECISION-MAKING - "DICTATOR/MONEY ALLOCATION GAME" (FORSYTHE ET AL., 1994; ENGEL, 2011)

- When couples have to make joint decisions, more often couples are able to agree in maximizing the household's income.
- Women do not seek to maximize their individual income when they jointly decide with the partner how to allocate the money.
- When they make joint decisions for the income allocation, women more often subdue to the demands of men in maximizing men's income.

WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT AS A MODERATOR OF BEHAVIOR IN THE ALLOCATION GAME

- Male partners of disempowered women are not likely to maximize the household's income but rather their own.
- Male partners of highly empowered women are more likely to maximize the household's income and contribute to the efficiency of the household by allocating more money to the woman and the household and less money for themselves.

KEY CONCLUSIONS

- Women behave differently when deciding alone or deciding jointly; in the husband's presence, woman tends to align their decision with their husband.
- Men have a higher bargaining power for intra-household decision-making.
- Empowered women are more likely to maximize household's efficiency.

